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Developing Countries
and the WTO
John J. Barceló III
When the World Trade Organization (WTO) was tries” and shelter local producers was highly touted.
founded ten years ago on January 1, 1995, commenta- This can be seen in Article XVIII of GATT. Under
tors hailed it as a major transformation of the world its provisions developing countries have wide-ranging
trading system. The new, more juristic and permanent authority to protect select industries with quotas that
World Trade Organization replaced the previous, more would otherwise run afoul of Article XI’s prohibition
pragmatic and ad hoc General Agreement on Tariffs on quantitative restrictions.
and Trade (GATT). The industrial countries, led by
In 1979, the GATT contracting parties expandthe United States, the EU, and Japan, brought about ed this exceptionalism for developing countries by
this change to consolidate and deepen their own and adopting the Enabling Clause, a clause which allows
the world’s commitment to an open trading system. industrial countries to grant the third world nonTheir support for the change was crucial because they reciprocal, preferential access to their markets. The
dominated the GATT, and they continue to dominate the WTO.
The world of trade is changing, Developing countries, led by China, India, and Brazil,
however, in another way. Developing are playing an increasingly important role and are
countries, led by China, India, and
Brazil, are playing an increasingly im- having a dramatic impact on the WTO’s agenda.
portant role and are having a dramatic impact on the WTO’s agenda. The
earliest signs of this second transformation were visible industrial countries did not allow similar access to
in the Uruguay Round negotiations that led up to the other GATT countries, and they got nothing in reWTO’s founding. In another context I have referred turn. This violated two cardinal principles of the trade
to this shift as a transition from a “Trade as Aid” to a regime: (i) non-discrimination, and (ii) reciprocity.
“Trade as Trade” regime for developing countries—a Non-discriminatory, most-favored-nation treatment
transition that is still unfolding.
(MFN) is enshrined in GATT Article I. Though regional arrangements compromise the MFN principle,
it is still the touchstone of the world trading system.
The Pre-Uruguay Round,
Reciprocity is also central. It normally takes the form
Two-Tier GATT
of mutually exchanged trade concessions agreed upon
During the lifespan of GATT, from 1947 to 1995, at periodic negotiating rounds, such as the current
developing countries were largely on the sidelines of Doha Round.
the world trade system. They were the recipients of
The 1979 Enabling Clause regime is known as the
largesse, but not serious participants in the function- Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Most of the
ing or governance of the regime. Theories of trade OECD countries, including the European Union and
and development prevalent in the early part of this the United States, have enacted such a regime, in each
period presumed that development required shelter case for a select group of developing countries and a
from the rigors of the competitive world market. The select group of products. These GSP programs allow
developing countries’ need to protect “infant indus- duty-free or reduced-duty access for eligible devel8 ~ Cornell Law Forum

oping-country goods, with no reciprocal concession
in return.
During this pre-WTO period, another aspect of
two-tier GATT emerged. In a series of GATT negotiating rounds, the industrial members negotiated and
adopted various “side-agreements” amending, expanding, and tightening the original GATT rules. Examples
are the Kennedy Round Antidumping Code (1968),
the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code (1979), and
the Tokyo Round Subsidies and Countervailing Duty
Code (1979). A good many developing countries failed
to adhere to these side agreements, and hence were
not bound by their disciplines. Thus, again, one set of
rules applied for the industrial world, and a different
set for the developing world.

quotas. The amendment did not, however, reduce the
high tariff levels on textiles.
Although the Uruguay Round made progress on
the third world’s behalf, it did not address the fundamental paradox of the two-tier system. It left the GSP
exceptionism in place, thus continuing the system of
reverse discrimination in favor of developing countries.
At the same time, it failed to deal effectively with
agricultural subsidies and tariff peaks on a range of
developing country exports not included in GSP. Thus,
there exists side-by-side in the current WTO regime
both positive discrimination in favor of developing
countries, and negative de facto discrimination against
them. Both of these results stem, in a sense, from the
two-tier GATT, from treating developing countries as
only marginal, not-fully-participating members.

The Uruguay Round
and Developing Countries

Perverse Positive Discrimination

This two-tier GATT system began to change during
the Uruguay Round negotiations from 1988 to 1995.
For the ﬁrst time, the GATT membership tried to
bring the developing countries into the trade regime
as fully functioning partners. For example, the WTO
came into being on the basis of what was called the
“single undertaking.” All previous GATT members
withdrew from the GATT and its many side agreements, and simultaneously became contracting parties
to the new WTO and all of its sub-agreements—one
of which includes the original GATT ’47 rules. Developing countries did the same.
This arrangement reﬂected a basic bargain. The
developing countries accepted once again the core
GATT rules, but also all of what had previously been
side-agreements. The bargain also required them to
accept the new agreement on protecting intellectual
property (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS). On the other side of the ledger, they gained advantages in agriculture and textiles.
Though these rights were limited, they were still real.
A new Agreement on Agriculture initiated reforms that
have the potential to liberalize agricultural trade in the
long term, and an amendment to the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing (ATC) set a deadline of January
1, 2005, for elimination of industrial country textile

Although certainly well-intentioned, the GSP nonreciprocal, preferential regime for developing countries has disappointed many observers. Some pitfalls
in the GSP regime are easy to grasp. As a form of
unilaterally granted largesse or benevolence (hence the
concept “Trade as Aid”), GSP access is unreliable and
constrained. If a developing country exporter makes
any real headway in capturing a substantial part of an
industrial country’s market, a backlash from competing local producers is quick to develop and hard to
resist. Trade ofﬁcials would be pilloried were they to
favor developing-country entrepreneurs over homegrown ﬁrms and workers—especially since the latter
go to the polls. Since preferential access is a “gift” in
the ﬁrst place, the gift can be legally withdrawn; and
when necessary, it is.
Moreover, attaching political conditions (“conditionality”) to the “gift” has been irresistible. Thus, to
be eligible for GSP treatment under the U.S. plan, a
developing country must afford adequate protection
for intellectual property, not expropriate the property
of U.S. citizens, guarantee adequate worker rights,
enjoy a clean bill of health on enforcing arbitral awards
in favor of U.S. citizens, support the U.S. efforts to
combat terrorism, and so on.1 Also, various “rules
of origin” conditions limit the beneﬁts that might
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otherwise ﬂow to non-eligible countries that produce
components for a ﬁnal product assembled in an eligible
country.
But the greatest drawback to the GSP regime is its
potential for perverse effects on development itself.
Both theoretical analysis and empirical studies 2 tend to
conﬁrm that development rates are more favorable for
countries not participating in the preferential regimes.
This seems to be largely—if not exclusively—because
of political-economic effects within the developing
country itself. Recall that the GSP regime gives exporters market access without asking for reciprocity.
Thus, the exporter constituency—normally the most
vigorous in advocating for free trade—is absent from
the lobbying hallways of GSP-beneﬁciary capitals.
In consequence, the import-competing constituency
ﬁnds itself in the happy position of calling all the
shots on trade policy. The result is an isolated (and
inefﬁcient) home market protected behind high tariff
and non-tariff walls. Thus, the GSP system tends to
produce high import barriers at home and unstable,
politically conditioned access abroad—a bargain of
Faustian proportions. The high import barriers cause
misallocation of resources and inefﬁciencies that actually retard development.

Paradoxical Negative Discrimination
The negative discrimination against developing country exports is perhaps even more pernicious, and also
derives from two-tier GATT—in particular, from
the non-participation of developing countries in the
bargaining give-and-take of the periodic negotiating
rounds. The dominant GATT players have been the
U.S., Europe, and Japan, each of which signiﬁcantly
subsidizes and protects agriculture. Similarly, the U.S.
and Europe have traditionally blocked open trade in
textiles and clothing. Many developing countries have
natural comparative advantages in these sectors and
would reap beneﬁts from their liberalization. Prior to
the Uruguay Round, however, agriculture and textiles were more or less off-limits because the major
industrial countries had no interest in liberalizing, and
the developing countries were not even in the game.
Two-tier GATT was the culprit.
10 ~ Cornell Law Forum

A seamstress works at a sewing machine at a factory in Ho Chi Minh City,
Vietnam. The factory exports clothing and toys all over the world.
The winds of change ﬁrst stirred in the early stages
of the Uruguay Round. By then, considerable rethinking had occurred in the ﬁeld of development economics. By the early 1980s, economists increasingly
recognized that closed markets were inefﬁcient and
counterproductive, even for developing countries,
and that outward-looking, export-led growth was
particularly promising. Both sides of that equation
(opening up at home and pursuing comparative advantage abroad) called for more normal and fuller
participation of developing countries in the reciprocal
give-and-take of the world trade system. The Uruguay
Round thus saw the beginning of the transformation away from two-tier GATT—a transformation
still in progress. With developing countries participating more fully than ever before, agricultural liberalization gained a foothold in the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture. The round also liberalized
textile trade.

The Doha (Development)
Round Challenges
Despite this progress, the challenges facing the negotiators in the current Doha Round are formidable. The round began in 2001, and will perhaps be
completed in 2007. It is known as the Development
Round because of its emphasis on aligning the WTO
with development goals. Some commentators have
criticized the “Development” theme, because they
believe—correctly, I think—that development depends fundamentally on internal conditions within
developing countries, and not so much on the prevailing trade regime. But, of course, as we have seen, the
trade regime can have important effects on an internal
market, and can facilitate, if not directly guarantee,
development. So what choices do the Doha Round
negotiators face?

A new role for developing countries would effectively
convert the WTO from a two-tier, “Trade as Aid”
system to a single-tier, “Trade as Trade” regime.
Despite the Uruguay Round progress, agricultural barriers and subsidies remain high. The textile trade, though denuded of quotas, still faces
high tariffs. And even though on-average industrial country tariffs are low, they often peak on
a range of goods of interest to the third world.
Thus, developing countries have clear negotiating
objectives.
A strong argument can also be made for dropping the non-reciprocal preferential access regime
of GSP—or at least limiting it. This could go
hand-in-hand with reciprocal market-opening commitments on the part of developing countries. In
other words, developing countries would begin to
assume normal membership in a single-tier WTO—
effectively converting the world trade body from a
two-tier, “Trade as Aid” system to a single-tier, “Trade
as Trade” regime.
The very existence of the current preferential regime
feeds opposition to such change. Even if preferential
market access is insecure, limited, and politically conditioned, some producers beneﬁt, and can be expected
to lobby against change. They will want to hold on
to what they have. At the same time, another trend
may undercut their inﬂuence and even their incentive to lobby forcefully. Inﬂuential voices in the trade
community are urging industrial countries to pursue
a “zero tariff ” target for MFN trade. 3 The closer the
negotiators come to this goal, the less important trade
preferences will be. So if preference margins are certain
to shrink, lobbying for continued preferential access
may not be worth the candle.
Again, on the other side of the bargaining ledger,
developing countries are pressing hard within the
Doha Round negotiations for a substantial reduction
and eventual end to agricultural subsidies, and for
further liberalization of tariff peaks on third world
exports. This is as it should be under a single-tier,
“Trade as Trade” approach.
It is true that some countries in the least developed
group would be harmed both by the elimination of
preferential access and—as net food importers—by
the phasing out of food subsidies. For these countries,
some have proposed a special compensatory fund,
perhaps administered by the World Bank or other

international organization, that could be used to ease
the burden of transition.4
Increasingly, of course, the bloc of countries once
treated simply as “developing countries” will experience differentiation. It will be easier for countries like
China, India, and Brazil, with larger, more important
markets, to make the transition from “Trade as Aid”
to “Trade as Trade” than it will be for the poorest and
least developed countries. Some have even suggested
that the more successful developing countries—whose
tariff levels are higher than those of industrial countries
and less likely to move to zero on the same timetable—
should consider preferential access to their markets for
the poorest countries. This would perpetuate, however,
the perverse effects associated with non-reciprocal preferences mentioned above.
Will the WTO continue its transition to a one-tier,
“Trade as Trade” regime for developing countries? Will
the negotiators succeed in eliminating agricultural
subsidies, and in truly liberalizing trade in textiles and
other products of interest to the Third World? Will
industrial tariffs move dramatically toward zero? These
are some of the challenges facing the negotiators as
they seek a successful conclusion of the Doha “Development” Round over the next year and a half. We
should wish them well and, if it continues to emerge,
hail the transition to a one-tier WTO.

John J. Barceló III,
William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law
and Reich Director,
Berger International
Legal Studies Program

1. See 19 U.S.C. sec 2462.
2. See Caglar Ozden and Eric Reinhardt, “The Perversity
of Preferences: GSP and Developing Country Trade Policies, 1976-2000,” February 15, 2002 (pdf version at http://
userwww.service.emory.edu/~erein/research/gsp2.pdf; video
presentation available following links at www.worldbank.
org); Arvind Panagariya, “EU Preferential Trade Policies and
Developing Countries,” 25 World Economy 1415 (2002).
3. See Peter Sutherland and Jagdish Bhagwati, et al., “The
Future of the WTO” at 26 (2004), available at http://www.
wto.org.
4. See Bernard Hoekman, “Overcoming Discrimination
Against Developing Countries,” at 32-34 (2004) (paper
presented at a Cornell-Cordell Hull Institute joint conference on the “WTO and the World Economy” held in Paris,
in July, 2004. The paper will be included in a conference
volume, Rethinking the WTO, edited by John Barceló and
Hugh Corbet, scheduled to appear in 2005.
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